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FINAL ARGUMENT: CONDUCT OF
VIRGINIA COUNSEL
JAMES P. WHYTE*
I.
Introduction: Scope of Argument
While the purpose, function and scope of final argu-
ment have ben variously described,1 it is fair to say that
is more than a mere summary of the evidence adduced at
trial. Its true purpose is to pull all of the evidence together
into a clear, coherent whole, under the law as given in the
court's instructions, and, perhaps most of all, to persuade
the jury that the facts presented in evidence justify, under
the law applicable to the case, a verdict for the advocate's
client. But since the art of persuasion has from time im-
memorial lent itself to emotional appeal,2 it is not surpris-
ing to find repeated attempts by counsel to win verdicts by
appealing to irrelevant matters and human prejudice instead
of attempting to convince juries that they are justified in
having the verdict because the facts and the law logically
dicate the result. The result of such attempts is error, some-
times harmless, but often reversible, along with new trials
and concomitant expenses.
*Professor of Law, College of William and Mary. A.B., 1943,
Bucknell University; M.A., 1948, Syracuse University; LL.B., 1951,
University of Colorado.
1 2 BELLI, MODERN TRIALS 1656 et seq. (1954); BUSCH, TRIAL
PROCEDURE MATERIALS 504 (1961); CUTLER, SUCCESS-
FUL TRIAL TACTICS 189-191 (1949); GOLDSTEIN, TRIAL
TECHNIQUE 607 (1935); 4 SCHWEITZER, CYCLOPEDIA OF
TRIAL PRACTICE §§ 714-725 (1954); VOGEL, FINAL ARGU-
MENT 4 (PLI pamphlet 1954).
2 The use of emotion in arguing to the jury is soundly condemned in
ARISTOTLE, RHETORIC 1-11 (Buckley trans. 1760). In CI-
CERO, DE ORATORE §§ 234-239 (Sutton transl., Rackham, ed.
1942) its use is mentioned, but not condemned as strongly as in
Aristotle. In QUINTILLIAN, INSTITUTES OF ORATORY, Bk,
II, Ch. 15 (Watson transl. 1856) its use is mentioned as a tech-
nique in argument. Contrary to popular belief "rhetoric," as
defined and explained by Aristotle, is a closely knit system of
logic which, if adopted by trial lawyers, -would aid forensic argu-
ment immeasurably.
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Yet the task of convincing juries is not sterile; it is not
limited merely to a prosaic review of the evidence cou-
pled with statements that the evidence meets the require-
ments of the law the judge has given to the jury. The advo-
cate may, using the evidence as a basis, make inferences, de-
ductions and conclusions. In a word, he may argue. Prob-
ably the most succinct statement of the scope of final argu-
ment has been given by Virginia's Supreme Court of Ap-
peals in Virginia Electric & Power Company v. Jayne, as
follows:
• . . To require counsel to confine their discussions
before -the jury to the law and the evidence is no hard-
ship, but is .in furtherance of justice, and of the prompt
disposition of controversies based upon law and the evi-
dence, subjdcted, of course, to any fair analysis or criti-
cisms which the ingenuity of counsel may devise.3
It has also been said that it is legitimate argument for
counsel to state all proper inferences from the evidence and
draw conclusions from -the evidence according to his own
system of reasoning.4
Such, then, is the function and scope of final argument.
But what is arguing under the law? Under what circum-
stances does the advocate depart from the evidence? What
remarks are irrelevant or prejudicial? When will the men-
tion of insurance cause a mistrial or reversal? What is
necessary to preserve the record for an appeal on a point of
improper argument? These questions, and others of similar
import, make it worthwhile to examine in detail errors
made by Virginia counsel in the final argument of civil
cases.
II.
Arguing the Law
It has been stated that counsel is permitted to argue
the evidence under the law. Is it ever permissible for coun-
3 151 Va. 694, 704; 144 S.E. 638, 641 (1928), rev'ing on other grounds.
4 Burr v. Virginia Ry. & Power Co., 151 Va. 934, 14-5 S.E. 833 (1928).
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sel to argue to the jury what law should be applied? May
counsel re-read the instructions given by the court to the
jury? Or is the matter of stating the law exclusively with-
in the province of the court? Until 1902, the law of Vir-
ginia was in grave doubt as to whether or not it was the
function of the jury to decide the law as well as the facts
of a case. It was first said that, regardless of the rule in
criminal cases, in a civil case it was for the judge alone to
expound the law, and that where the court has instructed
the jury on .the law it was no more competent for the jury
to encroach on the court by finding a verdict in defiance of
the law than it was for the court to encroach on the jury by
finding the facts. Thus it was not proper for counsel to
argue against the instructions of the court to induce the
jury to find a verdict in defiance of it. 5 And, no doubt, this
is still a correct statement of the law. But a short time later
in Norfolk & W. R. R. v. Hrman,6 the plaintiff was per-
mitted to read to the jury cases illustrative of damages
awarded in similar trials. In an interesting statement ap-
proving plaintiff's argument, the Court said:
While it is the province of the court to give the law
to the jury, it would be an unwarranted restriction upon
the legitimate scope of argument. . .if not a flagrant
act of usurpation, for a trial court to prohibit counsel...
from referring to and reading from decisions in similar
cases by courts of last resort. These are in fact the
sources of correct information for bench, bar and
jury .... 7
The doubts thus engendered as to the propriety of counsel's
reading law to the jury were resolved in Newport News &
0. P. Ry. & Electric Co. v. Bradford,8 where the trial court
5 Delaplane v. Crenshaw & Fisher, 15 Grat. (56 Va.) 457 (1860).
6 83 Va. 553, 8 S.E. 251 (1887), overruled, on the matter of reading
law to the jury, in Newport News & 0. P. Ry. & Elect. Co. v.
Bradford, 100 Va. 231, 40 S.E. 900 (1902). Cf., Allegheny Iron
Co. v. Teaford, 96 Va. 372, 31 S.E. 525 (1898).
7 Norfolk & W. R.R. v. Harman, supra, note 6, 83 Va. at 564, 8 S.E.
at 252.
8 100 Va. 231, 40 S.E. 900 (1902).
1964)
4 WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
had refused to permit defendant's counsel to read defini-
tions of "reasonable time" and "contributory negiligence"
to the jury from reported cases. Answering defendant's
claim of error, and firmly adhering to the rule that it is
solely the court's function to instruct the jury on the law,
the Court stated:
It has been the settled rule in Virginia that it is the
duty of the court to instruct the jury as to the law, and
the duty of the jury to follow the law as laid down by
the court, and it being, further the prevailing and prop-
er practice for the court to give its instructions in writ-
ing, in advance of the argument, it would seem to follow
as a necessary consequence that counsel should be con-
fined in their argument from legal premises, to the prop-
ositions of law embodied in the court's instructions. To
allow authorities to be read to the jury from the books
would be calculated to confuse and mislead them, and
cause them to disregard the court's instructions, and
deduce from the books their own idea of the law, which
they are not permitted to do. . .The due and speedy ad-
ministration of justice, to say nothing of the duty which
the court owes to its self-respect, demands that counsel
should be confined in their argument before a jury, from
legal premises, to the propositions of law embodied in
the court's instructions, and should not be permitted to
read authorities from the books.)
It follows, then, that once the court has instructed the jury
on the law to be applied to a case, counsel may not make
any argument in derrogation of such law. Thus, even
though the reading from a reported case may be complete-
ly in accord with the court's instructions, it will constitute
error upon proper objection being made.10 And counsel's
reading a statute which has no relevance to the case will, if
the record is properly preserved, be considered as designed
to mislead the jury and result in error."
9 Id. 100 Va. at 240; 40 S.E. at 903.
10 Piccolo v. Woodford, 184 Va. 432, 35 S.E.2d 393 (1945).
11 Lemons v. Harris, 115 Va. 809, 80 S.E. 740 (1914). rev'ing on
other grounds.
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Yet it does not follow from the foregoing rules that
counsel is absolutely prohibited from mentioning the law.
No valid objection can be made to counsel's re-reading the
instructions of the Court, and it has been held permissible
for counsel to read to the jury a complete instruction which
the court has given only in substance. 1 2 It is not error for
counsel to mention what the law has been, and then read
from the instructions of the court to show what the law
presently is. For example, it has been held proper for coun-
sel to state that before the adoption of a new constitution
the doctrine of assumption of risk would have prevented a
recovery in the case, but that the new constitution allowed a
rec, overy and then proceed to read the law allowing re-
covery from the court's instructions.' 3 Nor does it follow
that argument over the meaning of an instruction will con-
stitute error. In Diggs v. Lail,'4 the court had instructed the
jury that one who negligently inflicts personal injury on
another is responsible for all the ill effects which "naturally
and necessarily" follow the injury. Defendant then argued
that the injury was not caused by the accident because the
injury did not naturally and necessarily follow the accident.
Plaintiff responded that the instruction "doesn't mean
that." Defendant claimed error because plaintiff had at-
tacked the instructions. The holding was, however, that
plaintiff had not intended to attack the instruction, but
merely to question the interpretation defendant had given
to it. In any event, the incident appeared to be trivial and,
if error, not such as to require reversal.
III.
Argument Outside the Record
As a general rule, it may be stated that remarks of
counsel in final argument should be confined to the record.1
Where logical inferences and deductions can be made it is
12 Lane Bros & Co. v. Bauserman, 103 Va. 146, 48 S.E. 857 (1904).
'3 Chesapeake & 0. Ry. v. Rowsey's Adm'r., 108 Va. 62, 62 S.E.
363 (1908).
14 201 Va. 871, 114 S.E.2d 743 (1960), rev'ing on other grounds.
15 Virginia Electric & Power Co. v. Decatur, 173 Va. 153, 3 S.E.2d
172 (1939), r'ev'ing on other grounds.
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sometimes difficult to determine whether or not a particular
argument is within the record, that is based on the evi-
dence. Yet there are, in Virginia cases, numerous instances
of counsel's arguing matters which clearly have no rela-
tionship whatever to the facts produced by the evidence. It
is obvious that the results of a former trial of the same case
ordinarily have no relevancy to a retrial of the case and that
argument of such, if the court does not admonish the jury
to disregard it, will constitute error.1
The same principle applies when counsel seeks to ad-
vise the jury as to what may or may not be done with a ver-
dict. In Lynchburg Traction & Light Co. v. Guill,7 where
counsel argued to the jury that the verdict should be
liberal in favor of the plaintiff, for if a small verdict were
found the court could not increase it, whereas if a large
verdict were rendered, the court could reduce it to what was
considered a proper amount, the Supreme Court of Appeals
remarked that counsel should be content in asking for a
verdict based on the law and the evidence without sugges-
tions which might serve to put in peril an otherwise right-
eous verdict. Nor are matters which counsel may think are
"matters of common knowledge," but which have no foun-
dation in the evidence, proper as a subject for argument.
For example, where the trial court sustained an objection
to defendant's counsel making the argument that electric
trains, as a "matter of common knowledge" were the best
and safest for preventing fires, the Court in affirming the
trial court's ruling pointed out that the evidence was con-
fined to the locomotive which had set the fire and that there
was no evidence suggesting that electric trains were more
safe than others for preventing fires.'
Even where there is evidence in the record of the gen-
eral subject matter of counsel's argument, the argument
will not be permitted to be grossly illogical nor will it be
permitted to be of such speculative nature that it invades
18 Taylor v. Mallory, 96 Va. 18, 30 S.E. 472 (1898).
17 107 Va. 86, 57 S.E. 644 (1907).
Is Norfolk Southern R.R. v. Fentress, et al., 127 Va. 87, 102 S.E.
588 (1920).
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the province of the jury. In Baker-Matthews Lumber Co.,
Inc. v. Lincoln Furniture Mfg. Co.,19 counsel was prohibited
by the trial court from making the argument that certain
correspondence, which had been introduced into evidence,
along with the contract on which the suit was based, sug-
gested an intent to repudiate the contract. In denying an
assignment of error on this point, the Supreme Court of
Appeals found nothing in any of the evidence, including
the contract, to provide a factual basis for such argument.
In short, here counsel was not permitted to make non se-
quitur argument. Of similar import is Certified T. V. and
Appliance Co., Inc. v. Harrington," where in final argu-
ment, plaintiff's counsel used a blackboard to list the items
of plaintiff's damages, among which was a per diem esti-
mate of damages for pain and suffering. The trial court
overruled defendant's objection. In reversing, the Court
found no error in the use of the blackboard so long as the
figures placed on it are supported by the evidence. But in
regard to figures evaluating pain -and suffering, it was said:
To permit Plaintiff's counsel to suggest and argue
to the jury an amount to be allowed for pain, suffering,
mental anguish and disability calculated on a daily or
other fixed basis, allows him to invade the province of
the jury and to get before it what does not appear in
the evidence. . .The estimates of counsel may tend to
instill in the minds of the jurors impressions not found-
ed on the evidence. Verdicts should be based on deduc-
tions drawn by the jury from the evidence presented
and not the mere adoption of calculations submitted by
counsel.21
A much closer case, though one still embodying elements of
speculation, is presented when counsel makes use of analogy
and in so doing attempts to put the jury in the place of one
of the parties by the use of "you" in his remarks. In Phillips
V. Fulghum,22 for example, plaintiff's attorney drew an an-
19 153 Va. 14, 149 S.E. 517 (1929).
20 Z0I Va. 109, 109 S.E.2d 126 (1959).
21 Id. 201 Va. at 114-115; 109 S.E.2d at 131.
22 203 Va. 543, 125 S.E.2d 835 (1962).
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nalogy between a fictitious employee and employer, the em-
ployee having injuries like plaintiff's, and then proceeded
to describe the suffering the employee would have. In so
doing, liberal use of "you" was employed, ostensibly to have
the jury imagine it was plaintiff. In condemning this type
of argument, though not in the circumstances finding it
reversible error, the Supreme Court of Appeals reasoned
that since "you" was used in a hypothetical sense and not
addressed to the jury personally, it was not prejudicial be-
cause it did not appear to have affected the verdict.
One sure way for counsel to stray from the evidence in
final argument is to direct his remarks in a disparaging
manner to other counsel, to the corporate officers of one of
the parties, to the wealth of the other party, or to the "in-
terest" of witnesses when there is no evidence of such. This
type of argument is often classified as "inflammatory and
prejudicial", but it is also frequently condemned as not be-
ing based on the evidence. Out-of-court actions of opposing
counsel, for example, do not ordinarily provide any proof
of the issues of a case. In Bragg v. Hammack,23 defendant's
attorney was attempting to make the point that a cer-
tain letter denying libelous statements had been obtained by
intimidation. In the course of his argument he stated, "Can
you imagine, gentlemen of the jury, anything that would
be more liable to intimidate this poor old decrepit lady [de-
fendant] than for a lawyer of Mr. Revercomb's [plaintiff's
attorney] appearance, of his reputation, to have walked
into her house on Sunday morning. Think of it... You re-
member the girl under the influence of Mr. Revercomb and
Dr. Bragg gave him a paper saying the only reason she
left home was the work was too much for her to do. What
a fabrication they got her to sign." On appeal the holding
was that the import of the language used was to intimate
that the papers in question were secured in an improper
manner, and since there was no evidence to furnish a basis
for the statement, its only effect could have been to influ-
ence the jury. Similarly, where plaintiff's attorney argued,
"The higher officers of this company [defendant] who are
23 155 Va. 419, 155 S.E. 683 (1930).
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responsible for the management of this company and who
alone will feel with others whatever verdict you may ren-
der.. .", the Supreme Court of Appeals held that the effect
was to prejudice the jury against the officials and thus
cause the jury to render a verdict large enough to punish
the officials rather than to compensate plaintiff for the in-
juries he had received.24 Correspondingly, unless punitive
damages are recoverable, the wealth of a defendant is im-
material and irrelevant. Thus, in a case where the issues did
not allow punitive damages, plaintiff's counsel erred in tell-
ing the jury that defendant had $69,000,000 worth of stock
and that its stock was selling for $145.00 per share. Not
only was sure information irrelevant, it was without foun-
dation in the evidence. 25
It frequently happens that in defending damage suits,
an employee of the defendant is called as a witness. It is,
of course, within the power of the jury to weigh the testi-
mony of this witness in the light of his employment, and
decide whether or not he is worthy of belief. But can coun-
sel bring this point home forcibly to the jury in final argu-
ment? Surely he may if there is some evidence in the rec-
ord indicating the witness' interest, and surely he may re-
mind the jury that the witness is employed by defendant
if that fact has been introduced into evidence. But it does
not follow that counsel may argue that the witness testi-
fied as he did because he would have been discharged or
suspended from his employment had he testified otherwise.
Of course if it does appear as a matter of record that such
witness had been threatened with his job in order to obtain
his testimony, there is proper foundation for impeachment.
Without it, however, the -argument is improper, prejudicial
and grounds for reversal.26,2 7
25 Virginia Electric & Power Co. v. Jayne, supra, note 3.
24 Norfolk-Southern R.R. v. Tomlinson, 116 Va. 153, S1 S.E. 89
(1914).
26 Norfolk & W. R.R. v. Eley, 152 Va. 773, 148 S.E. 678 (1929).
27 See Nugent v. Nugent, 156 Va. 753, 159 S.E. 185 (1931) for a
case recognizing the right of counsel to comment on the weight
of evidence of the mental condition of the donor of property given
by a qualified expert.
1964]
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Notwithstanding, the foregoing rule is not without its
exceptions. The discretion of the trial court and the latitude
allowed counsel are conditioning factors. Sands & Co., Inc.
v. Norvell 28 is illustrative of these factors. Here plaintiff's
attorney said, in final argument, that the agents of defend-
ant had done wrong in handling plaintiff as they had, and
that he was not surprised that one of the agents was no
longer in the employ of defendant, for no one would want
to employ anyone who had brought about the conditions re-
sulting in the law suit. Defendant objected that there was
no evidence in the record that the agent had been dis-
charged. Plaintiff countered with the observation that the
jury had the evidence and could draw its own conclusion.
The court admonished the jury to decide the case on the
basis of the evidence and not by argument of counsel unless
supported by the evidence. In refusing to find error, the
Supreme Court of Appeals stressed the latitude of counsel
and the fact that, in the ordinary case, the discretion of
the trial court is decisive of questions of this kind.
It follows from what has been said that where there is
evidence in the record, counsel may discuss it. In so doing
he is not limited to a mere review. It is proper for him to
characterize the evidence in a logical manner. On direct
examination, for example, a witness had testified that the
train whistle had been blowing for a long time. Then in
response to the inquiry (the facts giving rise to the case
having happened on December 24), "Did it sound like it
had Christmas in its bones?" - the witness replied, "It
sounded like it had about a gallon in its bones." In final
argument, plaintiff's attorney referred to this testimony as
"hilarious." Defendant's objection to plaintiff's argument
was held to be without merit, the Court stating, in effect,
that the evidence (which was given without objection)
showed that the conduct in question tended to be noisy, or
merry, or even hilarious, and that there was nothing in the
record to indicate that the use of the term in any way in-
fluenced the jury.29
28 126 Va. 384, 101 S.E. 569 (1919).
29 Director General of Railroads v. Gordon, 134 Va. 381, 114 S.E.
668 (1922).
[VOL. 5:1
FINAL ARGUMENT
Not only may counsel characterize the evidence in a
logical manner, he may draw conclusions and inferences so
long as he does not mistake the facts upon which they are
based. In a case where a motorman had testified that he
had formed the habit of looking into a certain area of the
vehicle he was driving, it was held proper for counsel to
comment in final argument as follows: "Here is the motor-
man, who said he always looked in this space every time
before he pulled out; that it was a matter of habit. He knew
and I know and you know why he looked up in there; it was
because he knew that people went up in there, and he was
looking to see.. ." This argument was, of course, calculated
to show negligence on the part of the motorman-that he
knew passengers were riding on the car in an unsafe place,
and thus was related directly to an issue of the case. It
therefore escaped the condemnation of being labeled as
speculative argument.30
It has been stated previously that counsel may not en-
gage in speculative argument relative to the question of
damage for pain and suffering from physical injury.31 Yet
if there are "facts" in the record, even though such facts
are based on opinion, a well-drawn inference will not be
classified as speculation. Where, therefore, there was evi-
dence of a hiatus hernia claimed to have resulted from an
accident, and competent testimony described such hernia as
a permanent injury unless corrected by surgery and, fur-
ther, that surgery would be risky and undesirable, counsel
was permitted to argue with the aid of a chart that the in-
jury was a permanent one.32
If counsel may argue, relative to the question of dam-
ages, that an injury is permanent, does it follow that he
may inform the jury of the amount for which he is suing?
It has long been the rule in Virginia that a trial court may
tell the jury that the verdict may not exceed the amount
plaintiff claims. But until recently it has not been decided
30 Burr v. Virginia Ry. & Power Co., supra, note 4.
31 Certified T. V. and Appliance Co., Inc. v. Harrington, supra, note
20.
32 Phillips v. Fulghum, supra, note 22.
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whether or not counsel could inform the jury as to the
exact amount. In a case of first impression on this point,
the Supreme Court of Appeals has held that counsel may
do so-that it is absurd to allow the court to tell the jury
that the verdict may not exceed a certain amount then deny
counsel the right to tell the jury what the amount is. If
there is any danger of such information adversely affect-
ing the jury, the court may instruct the jury that mention
of the amount sued for is not evidence and should not be
considered in arriving at the amount, if any, of the award.33
If nothing else, this opinion should have the effect of pre-
venting juries from bringing in verdicts in excess of the
amount plaintiff claims, thus avoiding an occasional remit-
tur or new trial.
While argument must be based on the evidence intro-
duced at trial, there are two instances in Virginia law
where counsel have been permitted to base argument on
matters which are not evidence within the usual meaning
of the term. Prior to the adoption of the Rules, where a
demurrer to plaintiff's evidence was overruled, and judg-
ment was entered for plaintiff, plaintiff's counsel was per-
mitted to argue, relative to the amount of damages, that
so far as the jury was concerned, the demurrer to the evi-
dence was a practical admission of defendant's negligence.
The Supreme Court of Appeals held that there was noth-
ing here to prejudice the defendant. The fact that this case 34
was reversed on other grounds may, in part, explain the
holding. Otherwise, under the present Rules of Court, the
case seems to have little relevance. But what of the unique
situation where testimony is erroneously excluded and
counsel nonetheless proceeds to argue as though the evi-
dence had been admitted? Such was the situation in Rich-
mond Ice Co. v. Crystal Ice Co. 35 Here, in an action for rent,
33 Id. Observant counsel noting this holding may now be tempted
to ask on voir dire this question: "Plaintiff is suing in this case
for $50,000. If he proves injuries to this amount by a preponder-
ance of the evidence, under the law as given to you by the court
would you be willing to award him this sum?" Will this question
be considered an unreasonable extension of the rule? If not will
it be grounds for challenge for cause if a juror answers "no" to it?
34 Michael v. Roanoke Mach. Works, 90 Va. 492, 19 S.E. 261 (1894).
35 103 Va. 465, 49 S.E. 650 (1905).
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the trial court sustained an objection to a question asked
by plaintiff designed to bring out the fact that the premises
in question were rented merely to get rid of an objection-
able competitor. Notwithstanding the trial court's ruling,
plaintiff's counsel argued to the jury that the premises were
rented to get rid of a competitor. In refusing to find error
in this argument, the Supreme Court of Appeals pointed
out that the trial court in overruling the objection to the
argument had stated that if its attention had been directed
to a certain statute relative to the measure of damages to
be awarded to a tenant in case of rented premises being
demolished without his fault,36 the objection to the question
asked the witness would not have been sustained. Further,
since there was evidence showing the purpose for which
the premises were rented, it was material to argue the
amount of rent reduction, if any, to which the tenant was
entitled. It appears, then, that one may argue on the basis
of evidence which has erroneously been excluded from the
record, but it also appears that there is safety in having
other evidence in the record to form a foundation for the
argument.3 7
IV.
Inflammatory and Prejudicial Argument
Argument which is not based on the evidence is often
condemned as prejudicial, although it may not necessarily
36 VA. CODE § 2455 (1904).
37 Baker-Matthews Lumber Co. v. Lincoln Furniture Mfg. Co., Inc.,
148 Va. 413, 139 S.E. 254 (1927) is illustrative of the point that
remarks made in opening statement must be directed to matters
which are admissible as evidence. Here in an action for breach
of contract, it was alleged that defendant had cancelled an order
from plaintiff; that plaintiff sold the lumber and charged defend-
ant the difference. With his declaration (motion for judgment)plaintiff had filed a letter to the effect that the fact that the
market had declined should have no bearing on the case. Then in
opening statement, defendant told the jury that defendant had
received shipments from other suppliers and that it would have
accepted the order from plaintiff if it had been shipped. The
Supreme Court of Appeals denied plaintiff's claim of error, stating
that the letter insinuated defendant's motive in asking for can-
cellation of the contract (which defendant had done), and that
defendant had a right to repel the insinuation, the evidence tend-ing to show cancellation resulted from defendant's plant being
still under construction on the delivery date. Thus the rules gov-
erning counsel in opening statement basically parallel the rules
governing final argument.
1964]
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be inflammatory. Thus while many of the cases discussed
in this portion deal with argument for which there is no
basis in the evidence, most of them also deal with state-
.ments which appeal to sympathy, contain vituperation or
are intemperate. Such argument has been the subject of
firm disapproval and, as a general rule, is not tolerated.
It may be that to this intemperate attack upon the
defendant company the remarkable verdict of the jury
is to be attributed, for it is against the weight of the
evidence ... We have frequently had occasion to allude
to this bad. habit of too many attorneys, who in the ex-
citement of the contest ignore or forget that in a tri-
bunal engaged in the investigation and determination
of facts upon which the rights of the litigants depend,
passion, prejudice and vituperation have no proper
place; that the privilege and highest duty of counsel
should be to aid the court and the jury by accuracy,
learning, reason and persuasion to interpret the evi-
dence so as to ascertain the truth; and that violent
denunciations are a hindrance and not an aid thereto,
which should not be permitted in a court of justice. The
trial courts should firmly and unflinchingly restrain
such indulgences. When they fail to do so and verdicts
are induced thereby, they will and should be set aside.38
Still, as in the class of cases dealing with argument which
is outside the record, counsel is allowed latitude, and a re-
versal will be ordered only when the evil of the argument
cannot be corrected by the trial judge.
[Counsel's] liberties in argiment are large, but they
are not unlimited. He has no right to testify in the
argument nor to assume that there is evidence which
has no existence, nor to urge a decision which is favor-
able to his client by arousing sympathy exciting prej-
udice, or upon any grounds which is illegal. Sometimes
38 Eagle, Star and British Dominions Ins. Co. v. Heller, 149 Va. 82,
112; 140 S.E. 315, 323 (1927).
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the impropriety is so serious in character that its evil
effect cannot be corrected by the trial judge.39
Subject to proper objection being made,40 reversible in-
flammatory argument is something other than a casual re-
mark. It tends to excite and inflame, to focus strong atten-
tion on irrelevancies or to lead a jury to decide the case
solely on moralistic grounds. So colidemned was an argu-
ment by plaintiff's attorney to the effect that defendant's
employees who had testified against defendant were afraid
they would lose their jobs; that counsel for defendant rode
in private and palace cars when they came to court; that
the mind could not grasp the resources of the defendant,
while plaintiff was poor, and that defendant would hardly
feel the loss of the amount sued for; and that in estimating
the damages the jury could take into account that defendant
had taken many exceptions and would appeal if the verdict
went against it.42 The same applied when plaintiff's at-
torney argued, in response to defendant's argument that
he did not think the jury would let plaintiff get away with
his threat to ruin defendant, "... give me the judgment
and I'll guarantee it will not ruin [defendant] ; I'll guaran-
tee it will not hurt [defendant]." 43 The same disapproval
was voiced where plaintiff's counsel argued, "That man that
did the flagging, I believe he has been with the railroad
company, to be safe, anywhere from 20 to 25 years and if
he hadn't told somebody he went out there and flagged
this traffic he would have lost his job. That is how much
interest he had in -it. I am sure he would be fired. He
ought to have been fired anyway.""4
39 Atlantic Coast Realty Co. v. Robertson's Ex'r, 135 Va. 247, 263;
116 S.E. 476, 481 (1923).
40 See Part VI of this Article.
41 Crosswhite v. Barnes, 139 Va. 471, 124 S.E. 242 (1924).
42 Southern Ry. v. Simmons, 105 Va. 651, 55 S.E. 459 (1906), rev'i7ng
on other grounds.
43 Goble v. Bingler, 177 Va. 641, 15 S.E.2d 33 (1941).
44 Chesapeake & 0. Ry. v. Folkes, 179 Va. 60, 18 S.E.2d 309 (1942).
Cf., Norfolk & W. Ry. v. Eley, supra, note 26, for a ease emphasiz-
ing argument about discharging defendant's employees as having
no foundation in the evidence in contrast to being inflammatory
and prejudicial.
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Worthy of special mention as illustrative of argument
which has been characterized as inflammatory is Seymour
v. Richardson.45 This case has come to be known as the
"Golden Rule" case and is important because it demon-
strates that a remark which calls for basic human kindness
on the part of the jury may incur the displeasure of re-
viewing courts. Here, in closing argument, counsel for
plaintiff said, "All Mrs. Richardson asks you gentlemen to
do when you retire to your jury room is to apply the Golden
Rule. 'Do unto her as you wish that you would be done.'"
This does not appear to be of the stuff of which vituperation
or otherwise inflammatory argument is made, but nonethe-
less the court admonished that it should not be repeated in
the new trial ordered only on the issue of damages:
The important rule so attempted to be invoked was
designed to regulate the conduct of the men among
themselves before they bring their controversy to a
jury. The function of the jury is to decide according to
the evidence, not according to how its members might
wish to be treated.4 6
While argument may be inflammatory and prejudicial,
if it is provoked by the remarks of opposing counsel, the
Supreme Court of Appeals is likely not to consider it
grounds for reversal. Where plaintiff's attorney argued,
"My friend [opposing counsel] says that when a cab is con-
cerned one's imagination runs wild. It don't have to run
wild. The cab runs wild," the Court stated the following
rule:
It is apparent that the statement to which objection
was made was provoked by the prior statement of coun-
sel for the defendant, quoted by plaintiff's counsel. Such
being the case, we do not think it can be held that the
reply made by plaintiff's counsel was so far out of
bounds as to justify a new trial in any event...47
45 194 Va. 709, 75 S.E.2d 77 (1953), rev'ing on other grounds.
46 Id., 194 Va. at 715; 75 S.E.2d at 81.
47 Diamond Cab Co. v. Jones, 162 Va. 412, 418; 174 S.E. 675, 678
(1934).
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Of similar import is Brann v. F. W. Woolworth Co., Inc.4 8
Here defendant's counsel argued that plaintiff assumed de-
fendant was rich and that he would get damages regardless
of the evidence; that plaintiff's counsel was emotional; and
plaintiff was exaggerating damages as everyone did. In
something of a sarcastic attempt to "turn the other cheek,"
plaintiff's attorney stated that defendant's counsel had al-
ways been a fair judge; that he was not representing cor-
porations when plaintiff's attorney first came to the bar;
but that now he had been representing corporations for so
long that he thought plaintiff should go to defendant and
apologize to the store manager for falling on the ice the
manager had placed in front of the store. The same result
was announced in McGregor, Adm'r. v. Bradshw,49 where,
in an action against two defendants, the court instructed
the jury that a verdict could be returned against both. Then,
in final argument one of the defendant's attorneys main-
tained the evidence afforded no basis for bringing in a ver-
dict against one any more than the other. This was an-
swered by plaintiff's attorney stating that neither defend-
ant would be hurt by one penny if a verdict were rendered
for plaintiff. Here the court did not condemn plaintiff's
argument as inflammatory or prejudicial, but said if it
were, it was provoked by defendant's remarks.
There is a group of cases in Virginia law where counsel
have made inflammatory and prejudicial arguments yet
which are not reversed because the trial court has cured the
error by admonishing the jury to disregard the argument.
Such actions on the part of the trial court are considered
sufficient if there is not a manifest probability that the in-
flammatory argument has been prejudicial to the adverse
party,50 where it does not appear that the verdict has been
48 181 Va. 213, 24 S.E.2d 424 (1943). Cf., Bragg v. Hammack, supra,
note 23, where castigating opposing counsel was chiefly character-
ized as argument not based on the evidence.
49 193 Va. 787, 71 S.E.2d 361 (1952).
50 Washington & 0. D. Ry. v. Ward's Adm'r., 119 Va. 334, 89 S.E.
140 (1916); Third Buckingham Community, Inc. v. Anderson, 178
Va. 478, 17 S.E.2d 433 (1941); Norfolk Southern Ry. v. Harris,
190 Va. 966, 59 S.E.2d 110 (1950).
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affected by the prejudicial remarks, 51 where in general the
court has not abused its discretion, 52 and where offending
counsel has, upon objection, withdrawn the argument.53
Nonetheless, in the heat of trial, counsel may fail to move
the court for an admonishing instruction, thus waiving his
objection.54 It is important, therefore, to describe the fol-
lowing arguments as error-producing -f not cured by cau-
tionary -instructions.
To show a witness' bias, plaintiff's attorney under-
took, on cross-examination, to ask about an adverse
comment made by the witness concerning a coroner's
verdict. To defendant's objection that plaintiff was at-
tempting to get improper remarks before the jury,
plaintiff's attorney replied: "I am going to show the
bias of this witness, not when the jury is locked in the
room out of sight, but when the jury hears the evi-
dence. .." 55
Where counsel argued that certain witnesses were
employees of the defendant; that they were now testify-
ing falsely out of -a sense of loyalty to the employer
(after they had explained discrepancies in testimony
given at prior hearing on the basis that then they were
testifying out of a sense of duty to a fellow employee);
and that all of defendant's witnesses were under the
-domination -of defendant.56
"Where defendant characterized one of plaintiff's
witnesses as "zealous" and said he did not know why he
was so zealous. To which plaintiff's attorney replied, "I
know why Hall was so zealous. He saw this man [de-
51 Miller v. Jones, 174 Va. 336, 6 S.E.2d 607 (1940); County School
Board of Orange County v. Thomas, 201 Va. 608, 112 S.E.2d 877
(1960).
52 Cape Charles Flying Service, Inc. v. Nottingham, 187 Va. 444,
47 S.E.2d 540 (1948).
53 Montgomery Ward & (Jo. v. Nance, 165 Va. 363, 182 S.E. 264
(1935).
54 See Part VI of this Article.
55 Washington & 0. D. Ry. v. Ward's Adm'r., supra note 50.
56 Norfolk Southern Ry. v. Harris, supra, note 50. Cf., cases cited at
notes 26 and 44.
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fendant] coming up at such a rapid rate of speed. He
probably felt like I would. He felt like he wanted to take
a gun and shoot him." 57
Where plaintiff's attorney argued: "We respectful-
ly leave it in your hands and we are confident that when
you have assessed all the- evidence in this case in the
light of the Court's instructions in such amount that
if you should ever meet him in the street in later life
you cannot say I did not do you justice." 58
Where plaintiff's counsel -argued: "... it could have
been your child; it could have been the child of any one
of your friends or acquaintances just as well as the
child of Mr. and Mrs. Nottingham." 59
Where in an action for libel and slander, plaintiff's
attorney argued that defendant "kicked him down
further" by filing a plea of justification stating that
the allegedly libelous words were true.60
Yet it is not true that the admonition of the trial court
to disregard inflammatory and prejudicial remarks will
always completely cure the error. The case of P. Lorilard
Co., Inc. v. Clay,61 is illustrative of an instance where cau-
tionary instructions are partially ineffective in the light of
compounded error and a resulting excessive verdict. Here
plaintiff's attorney made remarks to the effect that the de-
fense of contributory negligence was outworn (which he
withdrew on objection); that machines were more expen-
sive than flesh and blood, that men could always be gotten,
but that it would cost money to buy new machines, and that
if the jury allowed his client to go from the courtroom with-
out compensation, they would be guilty of the character of
act which is bringing on anarchy in this country (which the
judge admonished the jury to disregard upon defendant's
57 Miller v. Jones, supra, note 51.
58 County School Board of Orange County v. Thomas, supra, note 51.
59 Cape Charles Flying Service, Inc. v. Nottingham, supra, note 52.
60 Montgomery Ward & Co. v. Nance, supra, note 53.
61 127 Va. 734, 104 S.E. 384 (1920).
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objection); and that the case was one where class was
pitted against class-labor against capital (which the
court, upon defendant's objection, admonished the jury not
to consider). On appeal defendant argued that the court's
admonishing the jury to disregard was ineffective and the
Supreme Court of Appeals agreed. Basing the decision
squarely on the size of the verdict, it was pointed out that
the award of $15,000 was excessive in light of the evidence
that plaintiff had returned to work at an increase in wages.
Still, the court did not reverse! It merely reduced the ver-
dict to $10,000 and affirmed the court below. It must be
concluded that the Supreme Court of Appeals has ultimate
faith in a jury's ability to follow admonishing instructions
of trial judges.
V.
The Mention of Insurance
Unless an insurance company is a party to a law suit,
mention of the fact that one of the parties is protected by
liability insurance is ordinarily prohibited. Yet expressions
of this rule vary in extremes. At least one jurisdiction
sometimes views the "real party in interest" as the insur-
ance company, and considers it "fraudulent" to conceal this
fact from the jury.62 Other jurisdictions consider the men-
tion of insurance so prejudicial that it is per se grounds for
a mistrial.63 The rule in Virginia, however, lies between
these extremes. Here the mention of insurance is considered
to be irrelevant and inadmissible, but, depending on the
circumstances, may or may not constitute reversible error.6 4
Subject, of course, to proper objection being made 65 where
62 Jessup v. Davis, 115 Neb. 1, A1 N.W. 190 (1926); Cf., Height v.
Nelson, 157 Neb. 641, 59 N.W.2d 576 (1953) indicating error if
not related to any issue in the case.
63 Birmingham Elect. Co. v. Carver, 255 Ala. 471, 52 So.2d 200
(1951); Northern Ariz. Supply Co. v. Stinson, 73 Ariz. 109, 238
P.2d 937 (1952).
64 See Walker v. Crossen, 168 Va. 410, 191 S.E. 753 (1937) for
suggestions as to how far counsel may go in mentioning insurance
on voir dire examination.
65 P. Lorrilard Co. v. Clay, supra, note 61; Bloxom v. McCoy, 178
Va. 343, 17 S.E.2d 401 (1941).
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attempts to put the mention of insurance before the jury
are deliberate -and repeated, a mistrial should be declared.
In Rinehart & Dennis Co., Inc. v. Brown,66 plaintiff's coun-
sel, in opening statement, informed the jury that the de-
fendant was only nominal, that the real defendant was an
insurance company. Defendant's objection was sustained,
and the court admonished the jury to disregard the remark.
Then, on cross-examination, counsel for plaintiff -asked an
officer of defendant whether defendant carried insurance.
Again objection was sustained and the jury was admon-
ished that insurance was irrelevant to the case. Finally, in
summing up, counsel again attempted to get the mention
of insurance before the jury, but was stopped by the trial
court. At no time did the trial court grant defendant's mo-
tions for a mistrial. In reversing a verdict for plaintiff,
the Supreme Court of Appeals stated:
It is too manifest to need argument, and indeed is
conceded everywhere that the fact that a defendant is
insured against accident can throw no light on whether
or not he has been negligent in a given case. Consequent-
ly, evidence of insurance is irrelevant and inadmissible
in an action against a defendant for a negligent in-
jury . . . What is the effect, however, of getting such
evidence before the jury over the objection of defend-
ant?
Ordinarily it must appear that defendant has been
prejudiced, and one way to determine this is to look at
the amount of the verdict. But examination of the size
of the verdict is not the only way to discover the prej-
udice. There may be cases where the evidence does not
warrant any recovery by plaintiff or the evidence leaves
it doubtful that plaintiff is entitled to recover. In such
cases the verdicts should be set aside .... But even in a
case where the right of the plaintiff to recover is doubt-
ful, the trial court should be alert to prevent any ad-
ventitious advantage that may turn the scales. The de-
66 137 Va. 670, 120 S.E. 269 (1923).
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termination of the issue should not be prejudiced by
improper evidence ... which may affect the result.67
Nor will the theory that mention of the insurance is
part of the res gestae or that it may constitute a statement
against interest suffice. to make it relevant and material.
For example, in opening statement plaintiff's attorney said
he'd prove that defendant told plaintiff at the scene of the
accident that he had insurance and that the insurance com-
pany would pay all of the damages. Then on direct examina-
tion plaintiff testified as to what defendant had said about
the insurance. Finally on cross-examination plaintiff asked
defendant if he had not made the statement to which
plaintiff testified. At each of these instances defendant ob-
jected, moved the matter be stricken and moved for a mis-
trial. Reversing, because of the trial court's failure to
grant defendant's motion for mistrial, the Court stated:
Any account of the transaction made at the time by
the defendant is a part of the res gestate, but the state-
ment that he had insurance is not an account of the
transaction. The alleged statement of the defendant that
it was his fault is admissible as evidence and there was
a proper and legal way to get it before the jury with
the omission of the suggestion of the insurance. This,
however, was not adopted. It was the declared inten-
tion of plaintiff's counsel to get it in not as part of the
res gestae but as substantive proof, and this was with
the approval of the trial court.6 8
Even when the carrying of insurance is mandatory, as
in the case of commercial carriers, the mention of insurance
67 Id., 137 Va. at 675-6; 120 S.E. at 271-272. 1n Gilbert v. Gulf Oil
Corp., 175 F.2d 705 (4th Cir. 1949), the trial court admitted
hearsay evidence and then counsel for defendant stated that the
real defendant was not Gulf but the local distributor who had
indemnified 'Gulf; further, that the real plaintiffs were out-of-
state insurance companies. In spite of a cautionary instruction,
the Court of Appeals reversed.
68 Lanhan v. Bond, 157 Va. 167, 176-1, 160 S.E. 89, 92 (1931).
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is prohibited. In WorreU v. WorreU,69 plaintiff passenger
was injured while riding on a bus (the driver being plain-
tiff's father). Plaintiff wished to stipulate that defendant
had notified the insurance company, as he was required to
do, and that the suit was being defended by the insurance
company. This the trial court refused to permit. The Su-
preme Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court on this
point, emphasizing that while the presence of liability in-
surance does not affect the merits of the cause of action
against the insured, it does lessen the effect of the liability
on the wrongdoer.
Notwithstanding the strict attitude expressed in the
foregoing cases relative to the mention of insurance, if such
mention is provoked it will not be grounds for reversal.
Such an instance appears in Majestic Steam Laundry, Inc.
v. Puckett.70 Here, in closing argument, defendant's counsel
referred to one witness as a police officer from Detroit
"down here" to go into defendant's pockets. Plaintiff's at-
torney replied, "If you give me a verdict for $11,000 1 won't
go into Mr. Bradley's pocket for one cent of it." Defendant,
of course, thought this was a rather furtive way of inform-
ing the jury that it was backed by liability insurance. But
in, view of defendant's remarks, the error was held to have
been invited.7 1
To constitute reversible error, it must further appear
that the mention of insurance is other than casual. Mere
surmise, for example, does not constitute a mention of in-
surance. Thus where a photographer in being questioned
about some pictures he had taken said that he gave them to
named persons who happened to be well known insurance
69 174 Va. 11, 4 S.E.2d 343 (1939). It obviously follows that if such
stipulations cannot be allowed to reach the jury, the jury's being
informed that there is insurance in the case from sources outside
the courtroom will constitute error. In Dozier v. Morrissette,
198 Va. 37, 92 S.E.2d 366 (1956) an insurance agent's advising
the jury on the courthouse green that both parties -were insured
constituted error.
70 161 Va. 524, 171 S.E. 491 (1983).
71 Accord, Maryland Casualty Co., Inc. v. Kelly, 45 F.2d 788 (4th
Cir. 1930).
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agents in the area, the Court held that in reality there had
been no mention of insurance. 72 The same result obtains
where mention of insurance is made unintentionally and it
appears that substantial justice has been done. Where,
therefore, defendant's attorney asked a doctor whether or
not another doctor was consulting on the case, and the wit-
ness replied by reading a letter from the consultant, "This
is an insurance case and although I am unable to find any
real difficulty, I would appreciate you seeing her in consul-
tation," a motion for mistrial was denied, and the denial of
the motion was affirmed on appeal because the mention of
insurance appeared to have been unresponsive and frag-
mentary.7 3 And, of course, if the mention of insurance is
not made in the presence of the jury, no prejudice can re-
sult.74
There are two instances in Virginia jurisprudence, how-
ever, where direct mention of insurance may be made. The
first is where the record shows that the action is for the
benefit of the insurance company. In Norfolk & Portsmouth
Belt Line R. R. v. Jones, 75 the action was originally brought
in the name of the administrator of an estate. Thereafter,
on the motion of the defendant, the court ordered the style
of plaintiff be amended to read as in the name of the admin-
istrator and "for the benefit of [X] Ins. Co. as its interest
might appear." Defendant then made objection to plaintiff's
attorney stating, in opening statement, that the action was
for the benefit of the widow and son. While finding that
counsel had not stated the whole truth, and that the jury
had a right to know what the record showed, the Court
held the error to be incidental and not affecting the final
judgment.
72 Gaines v. Campbeli, 159 Va. 504, 166 S.E. 704 (1932).
73 Simmons v. Boyd, 199 Va. 806, 102 S.E.2d 292 (1958). This is a
4-3 decision, the dissenters considering the mention of insurance
being prejudicial in the light of shallow proof of plaintiff's injuries
and the fact that the verdict was for the full amount of the suit.
Armstrong v. Rose, 170 Va. 190, 196 S.E. 613 (1939) is in accord
with the majority opinion.
74 Kiser v. Suthard, 162 Va. 456, 174 S.E. 687 (1934).
75 183 Va. 536, 2 S.E.2d 720 (1945).
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The second instance permitting mention of insurance is
where the presence of insurance is necessary to show in-
terest or bias of a witness. Highway Express Lines, Inc. v.
Fleming 76 is illustrative. Here defendant produced an in-
surance agent to testify at trial. The agent proceeded to
contradict five of plaintiff's witnesses. The question then
arose as to whether plaintiff could inform the jury that the
witness was an insurance agent for the purpose of showing
his bias. The trial court granted plaintiff's request, and, in
affirming, the Supreme Court of Appeals resolved the di-
lemma as follows:
In this Scylla-and Charbdis dilemma most courts
have attempted to concede something to each of the op-
posing principles, i.e., 'by allowing the question when
properly asked either of a juror on his voir dire or of a
witness to establish his interest or bias. 2 Wigmore on
Evidence, 3d Ed., sec. 282 a.7
In brief, as the Court said, in deciding whether or not de-
fendant was negligent, the jurors had to determine what
weight to give the witness, and were entitled to know his
interest or bias and his relation to the party ultimately
liable.
VI.
Procedural Aspects
It sometimes happens that error is claimed because the
trial court has refused to permit adequate time for final
argument. But the holdings are uniform that the time al-
lowed is within the sound discretion of the trial court and
its ruling will not be disturbed on appeal unless an abuse
of discretion clearly appears. Thus where the evidence is
brief and the instructions clear and simple, it is not error
to limit counsel to 50 minutes per side.78 On the other hand,
.76 185 Va. 666, 40 S.E.2d 294 (1946).
77 Id., 185 Va. at 672, 40 S.E.2d at 298.
78 Brown, Admr. v. Peters, Adm'r., 202 Va. 382, 117 S.E.2d 695;
Cohen v. Power, 183 Va. 258, 32 S.E.2d 64 (1944). The same rule
of discretion applies to the time allowed for argument on instruc-
tions. Seaboard Air Line Ry. v. J. E. Bowden & Co., 144 Va. 154,
131 S.E. 245 (1926).
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it is an abuse of discretion to limit counsel to 30 minutes
when the witnesses are many (five for plaintiff, ten for
defendant), where the issues are complicated and where the
instructions are lengthy (three at request of plaintiff, six at
request of defendant). And in such instances it will not con-
stitute a waiver of the point because counsel has failed to
request additonal time, it appearing that such request
would have been futile.79 Ordinarily, however, the proper
method for preserving such point for appeal is to request
additional time when the time allotted proves to be too short,
and to note an exception to an- adverse ruling on the re-
quest.80
When it comes to preserving the record for appeals
claiming error for improper argument, it is fundamental
that the language complained of -must appear in -the rec-
ord.8 1 And it is equally as important that the reasons for
the trial court's action on objections to improper argument
appear in the record in order for the reviewing court to
intelligently decide the matter.82
The method of properly getting the objections into the
record is simple. The rule may be succinctly stated as fol-
lows: The proper practice is to make objection when the
remark is made, the court requested to discharge the jury
and declare a mistrial or to instruct the jury to disregard
the improper remarks and note exceptions to any adverse
rulings of the court.83 In the application of this rule it must
be noted that it is mandatory that objection be made 84 and
that exception be taken to an adverse ruling. 5 To these re-
quirements there are no exceptions except in most unusual
circumstances.88 Probably the most common error, though,
is not the failure to make objection or the failure to save
79 Jerrell v. Norfolk & P. Belt Line R.R., 166 Va. 70, 184 S.E. 196
(1936).
80 Cohen v. Power, supra, note 77.
81 Norfolk & W. R.R. v. Shott, 92 Va. 34, 22 S.E. 811 (1895).
82 Lemons v. Harris, 115 Va. 809, 80 S.E. 740 (1914), supra, note 11.
83 -Chesapeake & 0. Ry. v. Foulkes, supra, note 44.
84 Brann v. F. W. Woolworth Co., Inc., supra, note 48.
85 Majestic Steam Laundry, Inc. v. Puckett, supra, note 70.
86 Cooke v. Griggs, 183 Va. 851, 33 S.E.2d 764 (1945).
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an exception, but the failure to make objection at the time
the improper remarks are made. It cannot be too strongly
stated that the time to make the objection is when the of-
fending words are stated. The reason is obvious: this is the
only time the trial court has an opportunity to make a di-
rect ruling on the objection.8 7 If the objection is not made
until the case is submitted to the jury 88 or until after ver-
diet,s9 it comes too late.
Equally as important as making timely objection is the
requirement that the court be requested to declare a mis-
trial. This may be so even were the court has, upon motion,
instructed the jury to disregard objectionable remarks.
Otherwise the question is demed to have been waived.90
Of course, the mere fact that objections are fully, cor-
rectly and timely made, and exceptions saved to adverse
rulings does not guarantee appellant success on appeal.
Here the harmless error doctrine may rise to haunt him. In
Virginia this doctrine is based on statute "I and is usually
invoked when the Supreme Court of Appeals considers a
cautionary instruction by the trial court to have been effec-
tive in removing the prejudice resulting from improper
argument.92 But the statute -is not a cure-all for improper
argument. It is applied only when it appears from the en-
tire record that a fair trial has been had:
... The statute contains no presumption that an er-
ror is harmless. It only applies where it plainly appears
87 Bloxom v. McCoy, supra, note 65.
88 Armstrong v. Rose, supra, note 73; Piccolo v. Woodford, 184 Va.
432, 35 S.E.2d 393 (1945), supra, note 10; Burks v. Webb, 199
Va. 296, 99 S.E.2d 629 (1957).
89 Southern Ry. v. Simmons, 105 Va. 651, 55 S.E. 459 (1906);
P. Lorrilard Co., Inc. v. Clay, supra, note 61; Southern Ry. v.
Johnson, 151 Va. 345, 146 S.E. 363 (1928).
90 Diamond Cab Co. v. Jones, supra, note 47; Gable v. Bingler, supra,
note 43; Virginia State Fair Ass'n. v. Burton, 182 Va. 365, 28
S.E.2d 716 (1944); Hargrow v. Watson, Adm'r., 200 Va. 30, 104
S.E.2d 37 (1958).
91 VA. CODE ANN. § 8-487 (1950).
92 P. Lorrilard Co., Inc. v. Clay, supra, note 61.
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that a fair trial on the merits has been had and that
substantial justice has been reached .... 1s
In deciding whether or not substantial justice has been
reached, so as to apply the harmless error doctrine, recourse
is often had to the size of the verdict. But it is erroneous
to so limit application of the rule, for such partakes of that
genius which comes only from hindsight. Thus if it appears
that no verdict for the prevailing party would have been
rendered but for the improper argument, the verdict will
be set aside regardless of its amount.9
4
VII.
Conclusions.
By and large, it is difficult to find anything to quarrel
about in the Supreme Court of Appeals' handling of cases
involving improper argument. Perhaps Certified T. V. and
Applicance Co., Inc. v. Harrington,95 bends a bit too far
backward in holding that actual estimations for pain and
suffering damages may not go to the jury. Since, as the
Court says, no concrete value can be placed on such dam-
ages, what is wrong with counsel's attempting to give the
jury some frame of reference for the job? The trial court's
usual instructions will inform the jury that argument of
counsel is not evidence and that it is the judge of the
amount of damages to be given. It is difficult to believe that
the average jury will believe that counsel's estimate of such
damages is the only, the controlling, figure on the subject.
And, from another viewpoint, perhaps some of the cases
considering the mention of insurance inadvertant and cas-
ual so as not to require reversal bend too far in favor of the
harmless error doctrine.9 6 The mention of insurance is not
!3 Dozier v. Morrisette, supra, note 69, 198 Va. at 41, 92 S.E.2d
at .369.
94 Norfolk & W. Ry. v. Eley, 152 Va. 773, 148 S.E. 678 (1929), supra,
note 26; Gilbert v. Gulf Oil Corp., supra, note 67.
95 201 Va. 109, 109 S.E.2d 126 (1959), supra, note 20.
96 Gaines v. Campbell, supra, note 72; Simmons v. Boyd, supra, note
7S.
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only, in most cases, immaterial and irrelevant, it is by its
very nature prejudicial. It is too easy for a jury, when the
question of actual liability is close, to resolve this issue in
favor of the plaintiff because it knows that defendant, hav-
ing insurance, will not personally be financially hurt. And
even where the issue of liability is not close, juries may be
inclined to compensate injured persons because they know
that impersonal, distant insurance companies will bear the
cost. Yet such criticism must be tempered in the light of
the facts that most juries probably assume that one or the
other of the parties is insured because of a great deal of
newspaper discussion of compulsory insurance laws, and
because of the expense involved in the granting of new
trials which likely would have the same result as the case
on appeal.
One comment can be made with certainty: the harmless
error doctrine, while it can, and often does, save a case from
reversal is too slippery a concept to rely upon as an excuse
for deliberately interjecting improper argument into a
trial. What at the time may seem mild, and corrective by
cautionary instructions, may prove, when the record is
finally assembled, to be one of a number of improper state-
ments which when viewed as a whole are indeed prejudicial.
None of this means that the "good old days of oratory"
are gone forever from the courtrooms. There is still room
for direct, vigorous and forceful argument within the rules
announced by the Court. As far as "persuasion" is con-
cerned, trial counsel will do well to remember some funda-
mental concepts. Juries respect judges and are likely to
seek refuge in instructions if and when they become con-
fused by arguments of counsel which have no relevancy or
logical connection to the evidence they have heard. Finally,
perhaps the best means of persuasion is good, sound, logi-
cal exposition-explanation of the facts. Emotions after all
are fleeting things. Excited passion and sympathy soon
give way to more even tenors of thought. But reasoned con-
viction, based on .facts, on logic, and on law is lasting and
permanent. Convince the jury, and the case is won-won
permanently.
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